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INTRODUCTION
In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.' the Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether a trademark consisting "purely
and simply, of a color" can be registered as a trademark under the
Lanham Act.2 The Court answered the question with an unequivo-
cal and unanimous "yes," leaving intact the Petitioner's trademark
registration of the "green-gold" color for its press pads sold to
commercial dry cleaners. The alternative would have been to
protect color only indirectly, as an element of an overall design.4
In its decision to protect color "pure and simple," the Court
accepted a false dichotomy: that its options were only the two
alternatives presented to it by the parties and the preexisting case
law. The court also accepted a false premise: that it is possible
for a mark to consist only of color. All trademarks, including color
marks, are composites of several elements. 5 The actual question
1. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
2. See id. at 1302 ("purely and simply, of a color"); id. at 1308 ("color, pure and
simple"); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994) (Lanham Act).
3. See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302, 1308.
4. See infra note 17; see also infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
5. In theory, there may be a potentially infinite number of "elements" in any mark.
Consider texture and variations within it, external lighting, atomic structure and other
factors. While description of all the elements comprising a trademark may be impossible,
it is also not necessary. Cf. infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. This Article
suggests, however, that trademark analysis should take as a starting point the composite
nature of all marks, and that it should be at least cognizant of some of the latent elements
that are often overlooked.
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implicated in Qualitex and similar cases is not whether mere color
should be deemed registrable, but whether a trademark can consist
of color alone.6
The issue raised in Qualitex is not merely a quibble over se-
mantics. The traditional arguments against protecting colors as
trademarks, specifically, the color depletion, shade confusion and
functionality theories,7 only make sense if one accepts the fiction
that color "pure and simple" is a possibility. If the inherent com-
posite nature of all marks is considered, these objections generally
subside.'
In failing to recognize the composite nature of trademarks,
including color trademarks, the Court may have violated the "Anti-
Dissection" rule, a cardinal rule of trademark law. This rule pro-
vides that "[t]he commercial impression of a trade-mark is derived
from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered
in detail." 9 A mark's individual components may be considered as
a preliminary step in determining its overall impression.10 Howev-
er, trademark law will not pick and choose particular elements to
protect; instead, it considers the mark as a whole.'1 By failing to
identify more accurately the composite nature of the trademark at
issue, and by protecting the "color" element to the exclusion of all
else, the Court violated this rule.
Despite Qualitex's shortcomings, -applying traditional tests
for infringement may correct problems in its analysis. 2 Moreover,
Qualitex's holding does not preclude courts from engaging, as
appropriate, in the accurate identification of latent elements. Such
an analysis may be useful in explaining apparent anomalies existing
in trademark doctrine, such as the courts' historical reluctance to
6. See discussion infra part I.C.
7. See infra notes 26-36, 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing these arguments).
8. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
9. Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46
(1920). See generally infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. An exception may be the func-
tionality doctrine. See infra note 56.
12. See infra part I.F.
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confer trademark protection on.the color of liquids. 13 It may also
draw some litigation away from abstract and hypothetical consider-
ations of trademarkability and focus them instead on the substan-
tive issues: whether the plaintiff's mark has acquired secondary
meaning, if the mark is not inherently distinctive, and whether the
two marks at issue are confusingly similar.'4
The Court's approach in Qualitex may reflect systematic
underdescription of trademarks by the courts and by parties. As
described in this Article, mark proponents may sometimes
underdescribe their own marks to overemphasize similarities with
the purportedly infringing marks of their competitors. At the same
time, underdescribing a mark may hurt a mark proponent where a
competitor argues, and the court accepts, that the mark is too basic
to receive protection.
This Article analyzes Qualitex, and its consequences for pro-
tecting so-called color marks from the premise that all marks, in-
cluding color marks, are unavoidably composite in nature. Part I
reviews the Court's analysis and holding in Qualitex, and identifies
the actual question implicated in the mere color trademark cases.
Part I also discusses the inherent composite nature of all marks and
the ability of existing trademark doctrine to absorb that recognition
without difficulty. Finally, Part I analyzes whether Qualitex violates
the Anti-Dissection Rule. Part II examines why the question in
Qualitex was so narrowly posed to the Court. Part II also demon-
strates that the traditional objections to trademark protection, in-
cluding the color depletion and shade confusion arguments, are
negated by the recognition that all marks are composites. Part III
addresses the protection of "color marks" after Qualitex. This part
first discusses the importance of properly describing the entirety of
the mark for which protection is sought, and the pitfalls that may
accompany underdescription. Part III then discusses possible appli-
cations of the type of trademark component identification discussed
here after Qualitex. It continues with an analysis of the special
problems presented by protection of colors in liquids. Next, Part
13. See infra part III.C.
14. See infra Conclusion.
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III discusses whether "color marks" can be inherently distinctive,
and therefore able to receive trademark protection before secondary
meaning has been demonstrated. This issue, not addressed by the
Court, is answered here in the affirmative. Finally, Part III reviews
a recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals case which appears to
conflict with Qualitex, and which may perpetuate some of the sys-
temic problems in trademark law here described.
This Article concludes by identifying a possible practical conse-
quence of adopting latent element identification, a consequence that
may transcend color marks. Accurate identification and recognition
of the many elements involved in trademarks can potentially draw
the courts away from an abstract and hypothetical analysis of
"trademarkability," and focus litigation instead on the substantive
infringement issues presented by plaintiffs' and defendants' marks.
I. THE QUESTION POSED (AND ANSWERED) IN QUALITEX
A. The Question Posed: Can Color Function as a Trademark?
In the Court's view, the question presented was "whether the
... Trademark Act of 1946 permits the registration of a trademark
that consists, purely and simply, of a color."' 5 As phrased in the
Petitioner's and Respondent's briefs, the question presented was
"[w]hether the Lanham Act prohibits the registration of color as a
trademark."' 6 The alternative to protecting color "purely and sim-
ply," at least in the eyes of the parties and the Court, was to pro-
tect it as an "element" of a trademark, in combination with other
design elements.' 7 Prior to Qualitex, it was generally accepted that
15. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302 (citation omitted). Qualitex registered its green-gold
color for pressmarks in 1991, during its dispute with Jacobson Products. See id.
16. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at i, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995) (No. 93-1577) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]; Brief for the Respondent
at i, Qualitex (No. 93-1577) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
17. See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308 (considering Respondent's argument that protec-
tion of colors is not needed since "a firm already may use color as part of a trademark");
see also Oral Argument at 36, Qualitex (No. 93-1577) [hereinafter Oral Argument]
("QUESTION: But everyone agrees, I take it, that color can be part of a registerable
device or symbol .... [Respondent]: Everyone-even I agree with that."); Respondent's
Brief at 1-2 ("Rather than seeking to protect color as part of a design, symbol, device,
19951
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"the Lanham Act already provides substantial protection for color,
both as an element of device, design, symbol or logo, or when
functioning as trade dress."' 8
B. The Court's Answer
The Court answered affirmatively, that color "pure and simple"
can comprise a registrable trademark. In a unanimous opinion, the
Court held that "color may sometimes meet the basic legal require-
ments for use as a trademark and that respondent['s] arguments do
not justify a special legal rule preventing color alone from serving
as a trademark."19 The Court concluded that since the Petitioner
had demonstrated that its mark had "secondary meaning" and there-
fore identifies and distinguishes its press pads from its competi-
tors', Qualitex's trademark use of the green-gold color should be
protected.20
The Court construed the Lanham Act as describing the "uni-
verse of things that can qualify as a trademark .... in the broadest
of terms. 21 It noted that both of the two substantive elements in
the Lanham Act's definition of trademarks were present in
Qualitex's green-gold mark. First, reasoning that "human beings
might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is
capable of carrying meaning," 22 the Court held that colors could be
encompassed within the Lanham Act's definition of "trademark" to
"'includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof.' '23 Second, the Court found that the requirement that the
logo or brand name .... Petitioner seeks an unwarranted, unnecessary and anti-competi-
tive extension of the Lanham Act .... "); id. at 8 ("[T]he Lanham Act already provides
substantial protection for color, both as an element of device, design, symbol or logo, or
when functioning as trade dress."); id. at 9 ("Color is protectable under the Lanham Act
when color is included as an element of a trademark."); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 12,
Qualitex (No. 93-1577) [hereinafter "Petitioner's Reply Brief"] (rebutting argument that
Lanham Act provides "adequate alternative protection for unregistered color"); infra notes
83-86 and accompanying text.
18. Respondent's Brief at 8. See generally infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
19. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
20. Id. at 1305, 1308.
21. Id. at 1302.
22. Id. at 1302-03.
23. Id. at 1302 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
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proposed mark be used "'to identify and distinguish [the regis-
trant's] goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and
to indicate the source of the goods"' could also be satisfied by a
color, at least where it has achieved secondary meaning.24 The
Court explained that "[iut is the source-distinguishing ability of a
mark-not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word,
or sign-that permits it to serve these basic purposes. ''25
The Court also considered whether the "functionality" doctrine
prevents the registration of color in all instances, and concluded
that it does not.26 The functionality doctrine provides that one may
not receive trademark protection for a product's useful features.2 7
A feature is considered functional "if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the arti-
cle. 28 By preventing manufacturers from putting "competitors at
a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage," the functionality
doctrine limits trademark law's anticompetitive tendencies. 29 The
24. Id. at 1303 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). Secondary meaning is the "mental
association in buyers' minds between the alleged mark and a single source of the prod-
uct." 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, § 15.02[1], at 15-8 (3d ed. 1995) (emphasis added); see also id. § 15.02[3], at 15-11
(summarizing "judicial definitions" of secondary meaning). The issue of whether a color
can be "inherently distinctive," and therefore be registered without showing secondary
meaning, remains open after Qualitex, although it was the focus of much of the oral
argument before the Court. See infra part III.D.
25. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
26. Id. at 1304, 1306-07.
27. See e.g. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.26. Protection of functional features
is the province of patent law, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which
confers relatively robust protection, for a limited time, to "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," id. § 101, that meets its rigid criteria
for protection. See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1988) (design patents).
28. Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982); see also Lee
Burgunder, Trademark Registration of Product Colors: Issues and Answers, 26 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 581, 609 (1986) ("[A] design is not protectable as a trademark if it
enables the product to perform its utilitarian functions in a way that is superior to designs
available to competitors." (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods. Co., 671 F.2d 1332
(C.C.P.A. 1982))); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.26[1], at 7-114 ("If the feature[s]
give the product more utility, or contribute to economy of manufacture, the features are
'functional' and are not capable of legal protection.").
29. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304 (citing Inwood Labs); see also Anthony V. Lupo,
The Pink Panther Sings the Blues: Is Color Capable of Trademark Protection?, 21 MEM.
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functionality doctrine is commonly invoked with respect to color
marks where there is a concern that protection will confer a com-
petitive advantage because consumers seeking to match new pur-
chases to old purchases will be induced to buy the trademark hold-
er's goods. 30  The Court noted that color is not necessarily func-
tional in every situation, including the case that was before it.31
Next, the Court rejected the traditional arguments supporting a
per se rule against registration of colors: the "shade confusion"
32
and "color depletion" arguments.33 In rejecting the shade confusion
argument, which questions the courts' competence to distinguish
among shades in reaching an infringement determination, the Court
rationalized that color does not present "special" problems in rela-
ST. U. L. REV. 637, 641 (1991) ("[D]e jure functionality exists when the design has utility
and is one of the few superior designs because it yields a competitive or economic advan-
tage.").
30. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 96 (S.D. Iowa 1982),
aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d
1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (color black held functional because of its compatibility with
other colors and its ability to decrease apparent motor size), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426
(1995). A particular color has also been held functional because of its "therapeutic
effect," as when used on medication, or because of its cost efficiency as when it is the
cheapest to apply. See, e.g., Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 853 (lower court held color blue
on pills functional because of therapeutic effect and use by persons attempting to identify
drugs in emergency situations); Burgunder, supra note 28, at 607 ("A product color also
may be supply functional if that color or combination of colors is less expensive to apply
to the product than are alternative colors."). Burgunder asserts that "[m]ost courts have
lost sight of the purpose of the functionality doctrine, and consequently have blended
many diverse and often inappropriate concepts into the doctrine." Id. at 606.
31. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304. For examples of cases in which color was found
to be functional, see supra note 30.
32. In NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991), the court explained its concern that if color per se were to
be appropriated as a trademark symbol, "infringement actions could soon degenerate into
questions of shade confusion" between closely similar shades. See also In re Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Deere & Co., 560 F.
Supp. at 97 n.20; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.16[1], at 7-70.
33. The color depletion theory originated in Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match
Co., 142 F. 727 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 589 (1906) (denying protection of blue
and red colors used on match tips on principle that given limited number of colors, other
manufacturers would monopolize those remaining and the available list of colors would
soon run out) and gained currency with Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d
795 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949).
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tion to the difficult comparisons that courts routinely make in
trademark infringement cases.34 The Court further explained that
the color depletion argument, which addresses the anticompetitive
effects of permitting an entity to monopolize one color, is implicat-
ed only occasionally and therefore does not justify a blanket rule
against registrability Where a problem does arise with respect to
a purported color mark, the Court reasoned that the functionality
doctrine would apply.36
The Court also refuted the continuing applicability of pre-
Lanham Act common law holdings that color alone may not be
protected. In the Court's view, the liberalization of trademark law
through enactment of the Lanham Act, including its extension of
registration to "descriptive marks" on a showing of secondary
meaning, represented Congressional rejection of the older common
law's generally restrictive approach to trademark protection.37
Finally, the Court considered the argument that protection of
color alone is unnecessary since color may be protected indirectly
through its combination with other design elements in an en-
forceable trademark, or, alternatively, as trade dress under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.38 The Court found these arguments un-
persuasive, explaining that there may be circumstances in which "a
34. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
35. Id. at 1306 ("This argument is unpersuasive ... largely because it relies on an
occasional problem to justify a blanket prohibition.").
36. Id.; see also Brunswick Corp., 35 F.3d at 1532 ("The functionality limitation on
trademark protection properly subsumes any lingering policy concerns embodied in the
'color depletion theory.').
37. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307-08. The older common law includes the Court's
own dictum, in A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S.
166, 171 (1906), that "[w]hether mere color can constitute a valid trade-mark may admit
of doubt." See infra text accompanying note 79. The Qualitex Court explained that
"[t]he Lanham Act significantly changed and liberalized the common law to 'dispense
with mere technical prohibitions' . . . most notably, by permitting trademark registration
of descriptive words .... where they had acquired 'secondary meaning."' Qualitex, 115
S. Ct. at 1307 (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)). This
"liberaliz[ing]" trend, in the Court's view, together with some subsequent revision of the
Lanham Act, evinced Congressional intent to include protection of colors within the ambit
of trademark law.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
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firm might want to use color, pure and simple, instead of color as
part of a design. '39 Since the protection available under trademark
law is more robust than that conferred on trade dress, the Court
noted that "one can easily find reasons why the law might provide
trademark protection in addition to trade dress protection. 40
C. The Actual Question Implicated: Is it Possible for a Trade-
mark to Consist Only of Color?
As the issues were framed by the parties, the Supreme Court
faced-two clear and mutually exclusive alternatives. First, it could
permit registration of color "alone," independently of other design
elements. Second, it could refuse such registration with the under-
standing that color would be protected incident to other design
elements in an overall configuration for which registration is per-
mitted.4' In limiting its decision to one of these alternatives, the
Court missed an important question: is it possible for a mark to
consist of color alone, that is, to be devoid of any other elements?
The answer is "no."
D. Resolving the Actual Legal Problem Posed
A registrable trademark cannot consist of color alone because
color never appears by itself in a mark. Color necessarily appears
in every mark designed for visual perception, and it is never a
mark's sole component. Color, itself, is a combination of three
different elements: hue, saturation and brightness.42 In addition,
these three elements can be applied in a variety of ways. The mark
under consideration in Qualitex, for example, was not simply
"green-gold." It was a solid green-gold that blanketed the entire
pad, presumably without any breaks or other designs. 43 At a mini-
39. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
40. Id. The Court noted that trademarks benefit from statutory provisions governing
importation of confusingly similar goods, constructive notice of ownership, incontestabili-
ty, and prima facie evidence of validity and ownership. Id.
41. See supra text accompanying note 17.
42. Color is defined as "the quality of an object or substance with respect to light
reflected by it, usu. determined visually by measurement of hue, saturation, and brightness
of the reflected light." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 268 (McGraw
Hill ed. 1991).
43. See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302, 1305, 1308 (describing Qualitex's mark);
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mum, the mark at issue in Qualitex had the following seven ele-
ments: (1) green-gold hue," (2) specific saturation, (3) specific
brightness, (4) solid application, (5) opaque, (6) applied all over
(i.e., conforming to the shape of the product), (7) without variation
in any of the previous elements.
.The second and third elements, saturation and brightness, will
not be specifically addressed, as they are subsumed under the broad
definition of color.45 Also, intuitively, ordinary viewers may be
less likely to perceive small variations in saturation and brightness
in comparison to variation in other mark elements.46 Therefore,
varying saturation and brightness in a mark will rarely, if ever,
result in a new, noninfringing mark.47
Except as noted, were any one of the elements described above
Petitioner's Brief at 6 ("For over 30 years, Qualitex has promoted and sold its SUN
GLOW [registered] commercial dry cleaning press pad using a fabric cover in a unique
green-gold color."); cf. Daniel R. Schechter, Comment, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.,
Inc.: The Supreme Court "Goes for the Gold" and Allows Trademark Protection for
Color Per Se, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481, 482 (1995) ("A color
per se trademark is a color used in a uniform, nondistinctive manner, and not in conjunc-
tion with any symbol."). In fact, in addition to the green-gold color, all Qualitex pads are
imprinted with the "SUN GLOW" mark on the "side or skirt portion of the press-pad
cover," raising the possibility that the parties underdescribed the mark at issue. See
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,' 13 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995); see also infra part III.A. (discussing consequences of
underdescription); infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (similar).
44. As a practical matter, trademark protection in one hue spreads beyond that
particular hue to all other hues that can be considered "confusingly similar." Cf. 1 MC-
CARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.16[1], at 7-69 to 7-70.
45. See supra note 42.
46. For example, viewers might simply interpret variations in "brightness" as a
change in exterior lighting conditions rather than in the mark itself.
47. For example, assume manufacturer Y has a trademark in a specific blue hue, of
a specific saturation and brightness, applied as an opaque solid all over a product without
variation. Manufacturer Z's use of the same hue, applied the same way, on the same
product, varying only the brightness and saturation, would probably be found to infringe
upon manufacturer Y's trademark. See generally infra notes 70-73 and accompanying
text (standard test for infringement). Varying merely saturation and brightness is unlikely
to create a separate "commercial impression" in consumers' minds, see infra notes 53-56
and accompanying text, because consumers may assume such differences arise from
changes in exterior lighting or factors relating to the mechanics of a mark's reproduction.
Cf. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305 (noting significance of "lighting conditions" in an in-
fringement determination).
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to be subtracted or altered significantly, a new, noninfringing, mark
could well result. Suppose, for example, element (4), "solid appli-
cation," is manipulated. Covering a pad with green-gold stripes
over its entire surface, using the exact same shade as the Qualitex
pad, would not necessarily cause consumers to think that the prod-
uct was produced by Qualitex.48 Nor would they necessarily
wrongfully attribute to Qualitex a pad which was partially covered
by green-gold, perhaps only at its borders.
In Qualitex, the question on which protection of Respondent's
mark turned, then, was whether a mark that consists of a solid,
designated color blanketed uniformly over some object is registra-
ble. Clearly, the answer is "yes." If a solid, designated color blan-
keted nonuniformly over an object is trademarkable, then, certain
other conditions being met, surely a solid application can be trade-
marked as well. The specific color would probably have to be
identified in any event since trademark protection is difficult,
though not impossible, to achieve for a distinctive application of an
unspecified color.49
Approaching the question in this way recognizes that all trade-
marks are "composites" of positive attributes. Given that "black,"
"white" and untinted "transparent" (i.e., clear) may be considered
colors for trademark purposes, 50 it is impossible to develop a graph-
48. Non-solid configurations will often involve at least one other color in combina-
tion with the "protected color." Stripes, for example, often involve two or more distinct
"colors." See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 42, at 1324
(defining "stripe" as "a narrow band differing in color, material or texture from the
background parts").
49. See, e.g., A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201
U.S. 166, 170 (1906) ("[Tlhe description of a colored streak, which would be answered
by a streak of any color painted spirally with the strand ... [is] too indefinite to be the
subject of a valid trademark."). But see In re Data Packaging Corp., 453 F.2d 1300, 1303
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (mark consisting of annular band on a computer tape reel of contrasting
but unspecified colors held "neither indefinite nor unduly broad"); In re Eagle Fence
Rentals, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 228, 231 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (permitting registration, as
service mark, of a contrasting color scheme applied in a "definite pattern" to chain-link
fencing, where individual colors to be applied were not specified).
50. See THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 470 (Oxford
Univ. Press. 1971) ("In speaking of the colours of objects, black and white, in which the
rays of light are respectively wholly absorbed and wholly reflected, are included."); cf.
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ically represented mark that does not contain at least one color. It
is likewise impossible to develop a design that does not consist of
a shape. In Qualitex, for example, the shape of the mark was the
contour of the press pad. Thus, any mark designed for visual per-
ception consists of a combination of at least color and shape."
Even trademarks that seek to minimize color or shape are compos-
ites of positive attributes, as one district court recognized when it
held that "simplicity of design itself [can] speak[] of origin. 52
Although the law recognizes that some trademarks are compos-
ites, it is nonetheless, in some sense, indifferent to that fact. 3 In
protecting composites, what matters is that the "totality" of the
mark is capable of serving the trademark function of identifying
Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
847 (1949) (considering color depletion argument and noting that "[t]he primary colors,
even adding black and white, are but few." (quoting Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw
Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1906))). While it may be harder for black or white
to be found protectable, the courts are at least willing to consider the issue. See Bruns-
wick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (use of color black on
marine outboard motors held de jure functional, and therefore not entitled to trademark
protection), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995); Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosme-
tics Mfg., 858 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (use of color black on rectangular
compacts held not sufficiently distinctive to be protectable), aff'd, 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir.
1995).
Courts have also protected marks distinctive for their use of untinted transparent
materials ("clear"), see, e.g., Essie Cosmetics, Ltd. v. Dae Do Int'l, Ltd., 808 F. Supp.
952, 954-55, 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), although such materials are frequently deemed func-
tional. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.28[l], at 7-166 ("The use of ordinary
packaging such as transparent cellophane is functional and free for all to use.").
51. Cf. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The
trade dress of a product 'involves the total image of a product and may include features
such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, [or] graphics."' (quoting John
H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11 th Cir. 1983))). Although
courts are more likely to identify the many elements that comprise trade dress, as com-
pared with their analysis of trademarks, in both cases protection turns on "overall impres-
sion." See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 8.01[l], at 8-2 ("To determine trade dress
infringement, the court must consider the total image or overall impression of plaintiff's
product, package and advertising and compare this with the corresponding image or
impression of the defendant's product.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
52. Essie Cosmetics, 808 F. Supp. at 955, 957 (enjoining competitor from copying
plaintiffs "square clear glass bottle with a simple cylindrical white cap" used to sell nail
polish). But see supra note 50 (citing 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.28[1], at 7-166).
53. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 11.10.
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and distinguishing the goods on which it is affixed. 4 This follows
from the rule that applies to all trademarks, whether explicitly rec-
ognized as composite or not, that "[t]he commercial impression of
a trade-mark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements
separated and considered in detail."" This principle, known as the
"Anti-Dissection Rule" does not, however, preclude identifying and
separately considering component parts as a preliminary step in
evaluating likely consumer reaction to a mark as a whole, or as
part of determining whether some elements are "functional" and
therefore ineligible for protection. 6
54. Id. § 7.14[1], at 7-60.
55. Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46
(1920); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe
validity and distinctiveness of a composite trademark is determined by viewing the trade-
mark as a whole, as it appears in the marketplace."); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Pizza
Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 24, §
23:22 (2 ed. 1984)). See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, §§ 7.1412], 11.1012]
("The Anti-Dissection Rule"). McCarthy explains that "a combination of separate ele-
ments must merge into a single unitary commercial impression to constitute a single
registerable trademark." Id. § 7.01[1][e], at 7-9 (footnote omitted).
56. Despite a theoretical antagonism to "dissecting" marks, in practice courts analyz-
ing trademarks often consider the elements of a mark. Courts must often at least identify,
if not actually analyze, a trademark's elements if only to describe it sufficiently in an
opinion. See, e.g., Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1328 n.1
(7th Cir. 1993) (providing particularly detailed description of mark involving "spiral
lines," contrasting colors, and "uniformly spaced intervals"); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner
Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 80 n.3 (3d Cir. 1982) (comparing detailed description
advanced during oral argument, of mark's "monochromatic colors," "black grid pattern,"
and "square patches," to somewhat simplified description used by the district court).
Consideration of a mark's components may be an appropriate step in the court's determi-
nation of a mark's overall effect, and in some cases a necessary step in the court's deter-
mination of a composite mark's distinctiveness. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d
1522, 1530 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[W]hile a composite term, including disclaimed words or
figures, is to be considered in its entirety in determining validity of a trade mark, it is a
settled principle of trade mark law that '[tihe dominant part of a mark may be given extra
weight on the issue of likelihood of confusion."' (quoting Continental Scale Corp. v.
Weight Watchers Int'l, 517 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (C.C.P.A. 1975))); 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 24, § 11.10[2], at 11-48 to 11-49 (citing In re Hester Indus., Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 797 n.5 (T.T.A.B. 1986)). But see Official Airline Guides, 6 F.3d at 1392 (reject-
ing this approach).
Courts will also isolate and study components of marks to determine if they are
functional and therefore ineligible for protection. See, e.g., Fabrication Enters., Inc. v.
Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In order properly to account for [the
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Accepting the analysis advanced above would have led to the
result that the Respondent sought: A mark of "color alone" would
have been found unenforceable under the Lanham Act. Conse-
quently, color would have been protectable only in connection with
other elements.
In practice, however, the reasoning used to reach this result
would have favored the Petitioner's position. The holding that
"color alone" cannot be an enforceable trademark would not have
flowed from an analysis of Congress' purpose in its statutory enact-
ments,57 or a rejection of the "color depletion," "shade confusion"
and "functionality" arguments.58 Rather, the holding would have
rested on the recognition that "color alone" is an impossibility.
Moreover, while the proposed holding would have protected color
only in combination with other design elements, it would not have
precluded registration of Qualitex's mark. Once construed as a
mark consisting of a solid green-gold color blanketed over a press
pad without variation in saturation or brightness, Qualitex's mark
becomes recognizable as an ordinary composite mark to which
traditional trademark principles can be applied.59
The Court would have barely created a ripple in the estab-
lished jurisprudence by recognizing that all trademarks are compos-
ites of elements, some of which are so basic that they are always
present if not always acknowledged. The established law analyzes
trademarks, whether characterized as "composite" or not, in the
same way. 6° Marks would have continued to be evaluated accord-
ing to their "overall effect," with color simply an element contrib-
anticompetitive effects of protecting functional elements in trade dress], a court must
examine a number of variables, including (1) the degree of functionality of the similar
features of the product, (2) the degree of similarity between the non-functional (ornamen-
tal) features of the competing products, and (3) the feasibility of alternative designs that
would not impair the utility of the product." (citing Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc.
809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987))).
57. See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307-08 (construing the legislative history of the
Lanham Act and its amendments).
58. See id. at 1305-07.
59. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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uting to the overall design. 6' New to the analysis of trademarks
would have been an increased sensitivity to latent design elements
previously not identified but which should be considered as part of
the totality. The more abstract question-"Can color alone serve
the trademark function?"-would have been laid to rest as irrel-
evant.
There is an indication that some members of the Supreme
Court,62 the Patent and Trademark Office,63 some of the parties 6
and even some of the lower courts that previously considered the
issue65 sensed the imprecision with which the issue was framed.
In oral argument, the Justices seemed perplexed by precisely the
question raised in this Article, when they implicitly acknowledged
that the mark Qualitex sought implicated not only color, but config-
uration (i.e., other design elements) as well:
61. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.04(e) (2d ed.
1993). The pre-Qualitex edition of the Patent and Trademark Office's manual contained
this language regarding submission of color marks: "The burden of proof in such a case
is substantial ... [W]here an applicant seeks registration for overall color, registration is
refused irrespective of any showing of acquired distinctiveness if there is a competitive
need for colors to remain in the industry." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64. The Respondent, for example, incorporated in its brief a definition of "color per
se" that implicitly recognized that the term incorporates the notions of "uniform[ity]" and
plainness of design (i.e., "solid"). Respondent's Brief at 6 ("A color per se is a color
used in a uniform, non-distinctive manner and not in connection with any definite or
arbitrary symbol or design." (citing 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.26 (2d ed. 1984))).
The Respondent asserted that Qualitex did not actually involve a trademark in color per
se, but rather that it implicated trade dress protection for "mere product color." Respon-
dent's Brief at 4-5. In this sense, at least implicitly, Respondent recognized that the issue
was not protection of mere color, but the way in which the color was used.
65. For example, the Owens-Corning opinion contains this language:
An overall color is akin to an over-all surface design, for which trademark
registration has been held to be available when the statutory requirements are
met. See, e.g., In re Todd Co., 290 F.2d 597, 600, 129 U.S.P.Q. 408, 410
(C.C.P.A. 1961) (registration on the Supplemental Register of a pattern of green
parallel lines for safety paper products).
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985). With this passage,
the Owens-Corning court distinguished between a solid color, which it termed an "overall
color," and stripes, which it termed "an over-all surface design." Id. Overall color is not
only "akin" to an over-all surface design: it is one. The district court in Qualitex recog-
nized that Qualitex's mark was at least analogous to a "design." Qualitex, 1991 WL
318798, at *6 ("[n]on-primary color, akin to an overall surface design") (emphasis added).
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QUESTION: [W]hy is the issue phrased as broadly as it is in
the questions presented? You're not asking for a monopoly on
this color. You're asking for a monopoly on the color used on
this particular ironing pad. Why is that different from a trade-
mark on this color in a triangle, for example?
MR. MULAK: Well, that-that is a-that is a symbol attached
to a color which may create a trademark. It's different because
our whole pad is in the one color-
QUESTION: Which is always in a particular shape, is it not?
It's kind of a long, narrow-
MR. MULAK: Yes.
QUESTION: But why is that different than if you just trade-
marked a triangle of this color.
QUESTION: [Y]ou're not claiming a monopoly on the color
on other products, or on other shapes, and I don't understand
why this case is different than the ordinary trademark case with
the triangle.
MR. MULAK: Well, this case is no different in terms of the
perspective of this Court deciding whether or not color alone is
a trademark, that's exactly correct.
QUESTION: But you're not deciding that color alone is a
trademark. You're deciding that color in this particular config-
uration on this particular product is a trademark.
MR. MULAK: No, Your Honor, I don't go so far as to talk
about configuration. Configuration may be another separate
element tied into trademarks, per se, that are allowed in color
right now. For instance, a configuration of the red cross, that
has been trademarked over the years, and that is a configura-
tion, so that when Your Honor puts the word "configuration"
into this trademark, it totally takes me into a whole different
perspective as well as into different trademark law. We're
talking about just color alone applied to a product, and that
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product is a press pad."
The Court apparently accepted Qualitex's attorney's explanation.
Consequently, the opinion lacked any reference to the role that
latent design elements necessarily play in all "color marks."
E. Did the Court Violate the Anti-Dissection Rule?
If the Court really meant what it said, that color "pure and
simple" deserves protection as divorced from other design elements
that inevitably appear in all graphically represented marks, then
Qualitex violates the Anti-Dissection Rule. As distinguished from
copyright, 67 trademark law does not pick and choose which ele-
ments of a mark to protect. 8 Qualitex's mark was comprised of at
least seven elements, as described above. 69 To mesh Qualitex with
the Anti-Dissection Rule, all of these elements would have to be
protected as part of Qualitex's composite mark, and not merely hue
or color.
F. Immediate Effect of Qualitex
As a practical matter, application of the standard test for "likeli-
hood of [consumer] confusion," the "keystone" of infringement,
will prevent trademark registrants such as Qualitex from having a
true monopoly on a particular color.70 For example, under the
analysis set forth in Polaroid Corp. v. Polorad Elecs, Corp.,71 a
leading test for likelihood of confusion, courts are required to con-
sider both the "proximity of the products," and the "degree of simi-
larity" between the two marks being compared, as well as other
variables:
[T]he prior owner's chance of success is a function of many
variables: the strength of [the prior owner's] mark, the
degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity
of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of de-
66. Oral Argument, at 16-18 (emphasis added).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 148-65.
68. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
69. See supra text accompanying note 44.
70. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23.
71. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
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fendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality
of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buy-
72ers.
Consideration of "proximity of the products" will ensure that even
under Qualitex, registration of a color by one manufacturer will not
necessarily preclude its use by another manufacturer on a different
product. Similarly, consideration of "actual similarity" may mean
that a mark that uses precisely the same color as the registrant's on
precisely the same product, but in a different configuration-for
example as stripes73-is noninfringing. Any imprecision in
Qualitex's holding, therefore, may be remedied through application
of the Polaroid factors and other tests for infringement.
Furthermore, protection of "color" marks under the Qualitex
holding will not necessarily prevent other manufacturers from reg-
istering marks that incorporate a color previously registered by a
competitor. Under the "related goods" test applied by the Trade-
mark Office, registration of a new mark will be refused only "if
[the mark] so resembles a previously registered mark. . . that buy-
ers are likely to think that the applicant's goods ... come from the
same source."74 Thus, the related goods test requires the Patent and
Trademark Office to do the kind of analysis described by Polaroid
and other cases.
72. Id. at 495. Originally developed for cases involving noncompeting goods, the
test is now applied to cases involving competing goods as well. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra
note 24, § 23.03[1], at 23-43.
73. See supra note 48 (noting that stripes generally implicate at least two colors).
74. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24.12[l][a], at 24-102. The Lanham Act provides:
No trade-mark ... shall be refused registration on the principal register on account
of its nature unless it ... [clonsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark [previously registered or used] . . . and not abandoned, as to be likely, when
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive ....
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994).
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE DIsPuTE
Why was the issue presented to the Court in an "all or nothing"
way that ignored both the unavoidable presence of color in all
graphically represented marks and color's inevitable dependence on
other elements? One answer is that composite marks are consid-
ered a subset of trademark law, rather than an inescapable norm.
Another answer is that the question developed over so long a peri-
od of time, a period incorporating passage of the Lanham Act and
its amendment, that perceptions of the contours of the color ques-
tion had become somewhat fixed.75
A. Pre-Qualitex Decisions
The issue before the Supreme Court in Qualitex had been previ-
ously characterized by courts in a variety of ways, including (1)
whether one can receive trademark protection for "color alone"; 76
(2) whether one can receive protection "when the color is an over-
all color rather than in the form of a design";77 and (3) whether a
"per se prohibition against protecting color as a trademark" is war-
ranted.78 The Supreme Court, considering the issue in dictum in
1906, opined probably not: "[w]hether mere color can constitute a
valid trade-mark may admit of doubt. Doubtless it may, if it be
impressed in a particular design, as a circle, square, triangle, a
cross, or a star.
79
Following years in which the courts disfavored trademark pro-
75. The Supreme Court case that set the stage for the debate was A. Leschen & Sons
Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166 (1906), which was decided
forty years before the Lanham Act liberalized trademark law.
76. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev'd on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
77. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
This language fails to acknowledge, however, that "overall" is a design. See supra note
65.
78. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 221 (8th Cir. 1993).
79. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., 201 U.S. at 171. In Leschen, the Court was not
confronted with the issue of whether to grant protection for a particular color, but whether
to protect a distinctive use of an undesignated color. The Court concluded that a mark
so described was too indefinite to receive protection. Id. at 171-72; see supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
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tection of color alone, 80 a circuit split developed.81 This split rein-
forced the binary nature of the dispute. On one side were the
Eighth and Federal Circuits, which held that color alone could be
registered.82  On the other side were the Ninth and Seventh Cir-
cuits, which held that registration of colors was not only undesir-
able, but unnecessary, in light of the indirect protection color re-
ceived in combination with other design elements.83
80. The view that color alone should not be protected by trademark law has "deep
common law roots." Brian Richard Henry, Right Hat, Wrong Peg: In re Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corporation and the Demise of the Mere Color Rule, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 389,
389 (1986).81. See generally Lawrence B. Ebert, Trademark Protection in Color: Do It By the
Numbers!, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 379, 391-400 (1994) (summary of split in circuits);
Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Color Trademarks: Shades of Confusion, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 554, 555-68 (1993) (same); Craig Summerfield, Note, Color as a
Trademark and the Mere Color Rule: The Circuit Split for Color Alone, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 973, 977-80 (1993) (describing practical effects of circuit split); Schechter, supra
note 43, at 483-85.
.82. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
no per se rule prohibited trademark protection of manufacturer's use of the color blue on
photographic splicing tape); In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (permitting registration of color "pink" for fibrous glass residential insulation).
See generally Richard L. Bridge, Note, Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corporation:
Equal Trademark Protection for Color Per Se, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 485 (1993-1994); Kirk
L. Peterson, Note, Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corporation: The Eighth Circuit
Refuses to Adopt a Per Se Prohibition on Trademark Protection of a Single Color, 79
IOWA L. REV. 753 (1994).
83. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir.
1994) ("Adequate protection is available when color is combined in distinctive patterns
or designs or combined in distinctive logos."), rev'd on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 1300
(1995); Nutrasweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990) ("'Color is
not subject to trade-mark monopoly except in connection with some definite arbitrary
symbol or design."' (quoting James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc.,
128 F.2d 6, 9 (6th Cir. 1942))), cert. denied., 499 U.S. 983 (1991); First Brands Corp. v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987); see also A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co.,
201 U.S. at 171 ("[I]f color be made the essential feature, it should be so defined, or
connected with some symbol or design, that other manufacturers may know what they
may safely do."); Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1128 (Bissell, J., dissenting) ("[Clolor must
be in the form of a design to constitute a trademark .... ); cf. Campbell Soup Co. v.
Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798-99 (3d Cir.) (implying that color should only be pro-
tected "if it is used in combination with a design in the form, for example, of a picture
or a geometric figure"), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949).
Other federal courts of appeals confronting trademark cases implicating the Owens-
Coming holding that no per se color bar exists decided the cases before them without
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Those Circuits opposing registration were heavily influenced by
Judge Bissell's dissent in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corpo-
ration.84 In his dissent, Judge Bissell adopted the position of pre-
Lanham Act courts "that color must be in the form of a design to
constitute a trademark."85 He concluded that "[c]olor uniformly
applied to a product is not a design because it has not been used
in connection [to] or combination with or impressed in some defi-
nite arbitrary symbol or design., 86  This view, however, fails to
recognize that a uniform application of a color is a design.
B. Debunking the Traditional Objections
Those courts rejecting protection of color never questioned the
meaning, or meaningfulness, of the phrase "color alone." If any-
thing, they accepted the fiction that a mark can consist only of
color. As the Owens-Corning dissent illustrates, even those oppos-
ing registrability frequently conflated the terms "color alone" and
"mere color" with "color uniformly applied" and "overall color. 87
By conflating the terms, the courts avoided confronting what "col-
taking a position on Owens-Corning. See, e.g., Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp.,
888 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1989) (declining to decide trademarkability of "color alone"
since the color at issue was combined with the nonfunctional shape of the blue label
which itself had acquired secondary meaning); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974,
992 (11 th Cir.), rereported, 812 F.2d 1531, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986) (where district court
had relied on Owens-Corning for the proposition that "color alone" could be protected,
court of appeals held use of color "royal blue" on foil wrapper for ice cream functional
-as suggestive of coldness-and therefore not protectable), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
84. 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1301-02 (discuss-
ing the Bissell dissent); Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027 (same). See generally Hillel I.
Pamess, Note, The Curse of the Pink Panther: The Legacy of the Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Dissent and Its Role in the Qualitex Supreme Court Appeal, 18 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 327 (1994).
85. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128 (Bissell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 1130 (Bissell, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 1118 ("overall color"); id. ("mere color" (quoting A. Leschen & Sons
Rope Co., 201 U.S. at 171)); id. at 1123 ("overall color"); id. at 1128 ("overall color")
(Bissell, J., dissenting); id. at 1130 ("[color uniformly applied") (dissent); id. at 1131
("color itself") (dissent); cf. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.
1993) (repeated use of term "color alone" to refer to uniform coating of photographic
splicing tape in blue); Nutrasweet, 917 F.2d at 1027 ("a particular color"); id. ("overall
color"); id. ("color alone").
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or alone" really means.
Moreover, the theories historically invoked to oppose protection
for "color alone,"primarily the color depletion and shade confusion
arguments,88 implicitly incorporated the notion that color can mean-
ingfully be considered in isolation. The concerns underlying both
the color depletion and the shade confusion arguments fizzle, how-
ever, when "a color alone" is understood to mean a particular solid
color applied all over without variation. Does the fact that the
Owens-Corning Company covers fiberglass insulation in solid,
opaque pink applied all over without variation in hue, brightness,
saturation or degree of opaqueness 89 preclude another manufacturer
from registering or using stripes of opaque pink applied all over
without variation? Probably not.9° Consequently, what palette is
depleted by permitting registration of the solid pink mark? When
"color alone" is understood to mean color in combination with
other design elements (e.g., "solid," "applied all over" and "without
variation"), the availability of other potentially noninfringing uses
of exactly the same color becomes obvious.
With respect to the shade confusion issue, two competitors
could, in theory, adopt precisely the same shade without 'creating
confusion simply by combining the shade with other design ele-
ments (e.g., one solid, the other striped or swirled). The fact that
a particular shade is used on two marks does not implicate
factfinder competence. What presents the difficulty is if both
marks draw on the same combination of elements, including ele-
ments like "solid" and "applied all over" that have been absent
from the court's considerations of "color" marks to date.
Marks consisting of combinations of several colors have tradi-
88. See generally Lupo, supra note 29, at 638-48 (describing traditional objections
to registration of color marks).
89. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d 1116 (holding color pink protectable as applied
to fiberglass insulation).
90. Conceivably, a consumer could confuse the second corner's use of the first
comer's color, but in a different configuration, as an attempt by the first comer to signal
a new development in its own product line. The likelihood of consumer confusion of this
type would be an issue for litigation; a finding of infringement would not be a certainty.
Cf. infra note 108 (discussing "strength" of marks).
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tionally received protection since "even protecting one arrangement
'would leave innumerable other combinations of the same colors
or other colors that could be assembled in a multitude of pat-
terns."' 91  When a "mere color" is understood actually to denote
an "arrangement," the same reasoning applies. Consequently, the
concerns underlying the shade confusion and color depletion argu-
ments are negated.
III. PROTECTION OF COLORS AFTER QUALITEX
A. Properly Identifying the Entirety of the Mark
The recognition that all marks are composites is crucial to
avoiding inadvertent violations of the Anti-Dissection Rule caused
by protecting only a subset of marks' features. Awareness of the
presence of a multiplicity-truly an infinite variety-of latent de-
sign elements in the composite mark may also be necessary to
avoid overemphasizing some marks' potential anticompetitive af-
fects.
1. Avoiding Violation of the Anti-Dissection Rule
Properly identifying the entirety of a given mark is critical to
avoiding Anti-Dissection Rule violations. In Qualitex, as described
above, the failure to recognize that the mark was a composite
meant that certain latent elements were not considered.92 Conse-
quently, the Court did not accurately consider the entirety of the
mark, but instead permitted protection based on identification of
only a subset of the mark's features. 93 Conferring protection based
on that underdescription of the mark thus violated the Anti-Dissec-
tion Rule.94
Such misdescriptions may not be limited to latent elements.
Consider Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc.,gs the leading case deny-
91. Henry, supra note 80, at 394 n.28 (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron Chemical
Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1126 (1982)).
92. See supra part I.D.
93. See supra part I.E.
94. See supra part I.E.
95. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
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ing protection for mere color on aesthetic functionality grounds.
In Deere, the court refused to protect the manufacturer's use of
"John Deere green" on its tractors, attachments and implements.
96
Protection, in the court's view, would have conferred a disadvan-
tage on competitors since farmers, "concerned with the aesthetics
of their farm machinery and prefer[ing] to match their loader[s] to
their tractor[s]," would be disinclined to purchase from manufactur-
ers other than Deere.97
A fact absent from the Deere opinion is that green is not the
only color to appear on Deere's tractors and attachments.98 Deere's
farm equipment has traditionally been painted in a highly distinc-
tive green and yellow combination, a scheme that continues to this
day.99 The court apparently focused on the color green because the
defendant's allegedly infringing front-loader, although painted
"John Deere green," lacked Deere's yellow trim. °' While the court
was apparently cognizant of its obligation to consider the "overall
appearance" of the mark, 10' the color "yellow" was notably absent
from the court's detailed identification of the numerous features
comprising the mark. 10 2 By effectively excluding the color "yel-
96. Id. at 94-101.
97. Id. at 91.
98. The court repeatedly characterized the problem before it as whether to protect
the color "John Deere green." See id. at 88 (5 mentions); id. at 89 & n.4 (5 mentions);
id. at 91 (1 mention); id. at 93 (4 mentions); id. at 96 & n.19 (3 mentions); id. at 97 &
n.20 (2 mentions); id. at 98 (1 mention); id. at 99 (3 mentions); id. at 100 (3 mentions);
id. at 101 (2 mentions). The word "yellow" does not appear in the opinion, except for
a reference to a different "color" case. See id. at 97 (citing Chevron Chem. Co. v. Volun-
tary Purchasing Group, 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981)).
99. Telephone Interview with Leslie Stegh, Archivist, Deere & Co. (Oct. 25, 1995)
[hereinafter Stegh Interview]; Telephone Interview with John Nolan, Senior Patent Coun-
sel, Deere & Co. (Oct. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Nolan Interview]; see also Lee Stratton,
Retired Farmer has a Soft Spot in His Heart for John Deere, COLUM. DISPATCH, June 16,
1993, at IF (describing a farmer's "passion" for "John Deere's bright-green tractors with
yellow trim"). With respect to Deere tractors, the color scheme of a green body with
yellow wheels and a horizontal stripe on the hood dates back to the 1920s. Stegh Inter-
view, supra. Deere farm implements were colored green and yellow, as well as other
colors, from the 1890s onward; green and yellow predominated beginning in the 1920s,
and became the exclusive scheme in the 1940s. Id.
100. Stegh & Nolan Interviews, supra note 99.
101. See Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 89-90.
102. See id. In addition to use of "John Deere green," the court discussed these
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low" from the mark's "overall appearance," and using that misde-
scription to determine whether the mark merited protection, the
court violated the Anti-Dissection Rule. Indeed, in later litigation
over whether Deere's application for trademark protection for its
color scheme should be granted, the Trademark Trial and Appeals
Board emphasized: "we are not :dealing in this case with a single
overall color but with two colors applied in a specific and arbitrary
fashion."' '03
2. Avoiding Creating Problems of Anticompetitivenss
Another reason for recognizing the composite nature of all
marks is to prevent creating anticompetiveness problems where
such problems do not exist. Defining a mark by only a subset of
its features can make it seem more potentially anticompetitive than
it really is. Correlatively, defining a mark in as comprehensive
terms as reasonably possible may limit perception of a mark's
anticompetitive potential.
These observations follow from the role that "degree of similar-
ity" plays in determining whether an infringer's mark is confusing-
ly similar to the trademark holder's under standard tests for in-
fringement.1°4 Especially with "picture and design marks ... simi-
larity of appearance is controlling." 10 5 Intuitively, the more features
features that comprised the whole:
The shape of the loader mast ... [;] [t]he shape of the mounting frame ... [;]
[t]he location of the torque tube... [;] [t]he flat top of the bucket... [; [t]he
location of the lift and bucket cylinders on the knee plate ... (;] [t]he routing
of the hydraulic lines ... [;] [t]he shape and location of the decals ... (;] [t]he
elimination of weld-on tabs to mount the cylinders ... [;] [t]he use of straight
lines to compliment the contour of the Deere Generation 1I tractors ... [;] [t]he
use of continuous welds ... [;] [t]he bent-over front lip on the top of the loader
bucket ... [;] [t]rim and radii details in crucial locations.
Id. (citations omitted). The reference to "[t]rim ... details in crucial locations" is the
closest the opinion came to mentioning the striking and distinctive application of yellow
to Deere's tractors and implements.
103. In re Deere & Co., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1404 (T.T.A.B. 1988). Deere's
application for registration described its mark as "a bright green color, sometimes known
as 'John Deere' green and a bright yellow color." Id. at 1402.
104. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note
24, § 23.07 (discussing role of "[slimilarity of [aippearance" in infringement actions).
105. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 23.07, at 23-52.5.
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a mark is recognized to possess, the larger the universe of poten-
tially noncompeting marks will be, since each feature translates into
a potential point of difference. Part of appreciating a mark's com-
plexity, i.e., the variety of potential points of difference, is to ap-
preciate the presence of latent elements in the mark.
Deere is an example of the court and parties creating more of
an "anticompetitiveness" problem than actually existed-in that
case by ignoring nonlatent elements. 1°6 By characterizing Deere's
trademark only as "green," Deere and the court obscured a substan-
tial difference between Deere's mark and that of its competitors:
one mark involved two colors and the other involved only one
color."°7 Whether that difference was enough to avoid a finding of
"confusingly similar" is another question altogether-one not con-
sidered by the court since it felt it had to deny protection to
Deere's mark on the grounds of (1) nonprotection of color per se,
and (2) aesthetic functionality: the potentially anticompetitive
effect of conferring a monopoly on a specific color which competi-
tor's may need to facilitate matching with their own products."0 8
In fact, competitors could have considered a multiplicity of
alternative designs matching Deere's tractor. Some combinations
that might have matched Deere's green and yellow design include:
solid green; green stripes on an unfinished metal background; a
yellow background with green trim; some combination of green,
white and yellow; a solid green background with an unobtrustive,
but clearly visible, purple trim; a. solid black background with
green trim. Whether any (or all) of these marks would have been
106. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
108. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. A competitor applying the same
yellow and green hues in exactly the same arrangement on its own tractors or farm
implements and attachments would infringe Deere's mark. If Deere's mark were found
to be sufficiently "strong," it is possible a competitor's use of any arrangement of Deere's
green and yellow colors would be infringing. If Deere's mark were really strong, it is
even possible that merely applying Deere's shade of green on atractor or farm implement
would be infringing. That result would follow not, however, from an underdescription
of Deere's mark; rather, it would be based on the concept of mark "strength," which in
turn reflects the extent to which consumers have developed an awareness of the connec-
tion between a given mark and the source of the goods. See generally 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 24, § 11.24; infra note 112.
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"confusingly similar" to Deere's is a question for the factfinder.
In order for aesthetic functionality to carry weight, the court would
have had to find that every one of the infinite variety of arguably
matching designs was confusingly similar to Deere's yellow and
green.
In Deere, misdescription of the mark ultimately distracted the
court from the concrete issue presented: whether the two marks
were confusingly similar. The consequence of ruling on the theo-
retical issue of protectability-an issue which only emerged
through the court's acceptance of the parties' misdescription-was
to foreclose prematurely the opportunity to litigate the concrete
factual issues presented by the competing marks. Underdescription
of marks, and attendant shifts in litigation focus from concrete
issues of infringement to theoretical issues of protectability, may be
systemic in trademark law. °9
In Qualitex and the true "mere color" cases, anticompetiveness
problems are created when the presence of latent elements is ig-
nored. Consider protection of "color alone," in the sense of color
not combined with any other elements, including latent elements,
in effect, disembodied color. Such protection would, at least in
theory, place greater restraint on competitors than is required. If
the fact that Qualitex has a trademark for "green-gold alone" means
that no other manufacturer of similar pads can use any "green-
gold," not even a small splotch, then protection is too broad.
Clearly some "green-gold" could be used-perhaps in combination
with other colors, or in a different but distinctive applica-
tion-without creating confusion in consumers' minds as to the
source of the product." ° It is not "green-gold alone" that merits
109. See infra text accompanying notes 173-75. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs, Ltd., Nos. 94-7968, 94-9024, 1995 WL 673250, at *9-10 (2d Cir. Nov. 13,
1995) (rejecting defendant's attempt to overemphasize anticompetitive potential of plain-
tiffs mark by underdescribing its material components).
110. Careful, nonconfusing and noninfringing use by one manufacturer on its own
products of a color often linked to a competitor's products might in fact serve a useful
function for manufacturers and consumers alike. It could serve to say "this product is like
my competitor's but it is from another company." This is the theory behind "store
brands" of popular products such as household cleaning cleanser.
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protection, but "solid," "green-gold," "all over," and "without vari-
ation," if the goal is merely to prevent consumer confusion."'
B. Identifying Latent Elements After Qualitex
While Qualitex accepted the notion that "color alone" may
comprise a protectable trademark, the Court's holding does not
prevent courts from accurately identifying the latent elements in
marks as appropriate. The Court's failure to recognize the inherent
composite nature of all marks should not inhibit other courts from
doing so.
Accurate identification and recognition of the many elements
present in trademarks can be readily incorporated into the Polaroid
analysis and other existing doctrines with little evolution in the law.
Consider some of the traditional principles: the distinction between
the scope of protection conferred on "weak" versus "strong"
marks;'12 exclusion from protection of designs that are purely deco-
rative and ornamental and therefore incapable of serving a trade-
mark's source-identifying function; u1 3 and the test of whether a
mark consisting of a background design, or a uniform covering for
the surface of a package or product, is protectable: whether a "sep-
arate impression" in the mind of the consumer is created.'
14
111. In practice, infringement tests such as Polaroid will limit the scope of any
underdescribed color mark's monopolistic tendencies. See supra part I.F.
112. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 11.24. Marks exist, in some
sense, along a continuum, from "weak" to "strong." The strength of a mark affects the
scope of protection it Will receive, with respect to "market," (i.e., across product lines)
"format," and "territory" (i.e., across geographical boundaries). id. § 11.24[1]. Strength
may be synonymous with distinctiveness. See McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc.,
599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The term 'strength' as applied to trademarks refers
to the distinctiveness of the mark, or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods
sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous,
source.") (citation omitted).
113. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.06. Purely ornamental and
decorative marks are not entitled to trademark protection. See, e.g., Major Pool Equip.
Corp. v. Ideal Pool Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 582 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (swimming pool
tile design held "mere refinement of the general ornamental concept, rather than . . . a
trademark"); in re David Crystal, Inc., 296 F.2d 771 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (registration denied
for purely ornamental mark of stripes on socks where secondary meaning was not shown).
114. See, e.g., Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir.
1989) ("A background design, when used in connection with a word mark in such a way
as to create in the minds of the consuming public a commercial impression, separate and
apart from the word mark itself, may be protected as a separate mark."); In re Chemical
1995]
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The fact that a hue is applied uniformly as a solid rather than
in combination withother hues or with some fanciful variation in
application may increase its chances of being found "weak."' 1 5
Similarly, a solid color applied uniformly may be more-or
less-likely to be considered ,"decorative or ornamental" than one
more fancifully applied.. 6 For example, it is sometimes suggested
that the greater the repetition in a pattern, the more likely that the
pattern will lose its distinctiveness and be perceived by the buyer
as mere ornamentation. 117 Presumably, since a solid represents in
some sense an infinite repetition of a splotch of color, solids as a
group will be more likely to be found merely decorative. The
relative ordinariness of a solid applied uniformly, in comparison
with other types of applications of color, may mean that solids as
a group will less frequently be found to create "a separate impres-
sion" in the minds of consumers when used as an overall covering
Dynamics, Inc., 839 F.2d 1569, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (similar). See generally 1 MCCAR-
THY, supra note 24, § 7.08.
115. See, e.g., Lupo, supra note 29, at 647 n.50 ("Color marks by their nature are
inherently weak marks and therefore may require a greater showing of secondary meaning
than would be required for a word or design mark."). Lupo identifies three reasons why
color marks are generally considered weak: 1) the "available palette of colors is more
limited" than the available palette of other types of marks; 2) the fact that all goods have
colors; and 3) the tendency of consumers to perceive colors as mere ornamentation. Id.
at 647. He notes, however, that "instances [ ] when a color is inherently distinctive or
has achieved a high degree of consumer recognition as to source of origin justify entitling
the mark to a broad area of protection ... [an approach consistent with treatment of any
other strong mark." Id.
116. See, e.g., In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1195,
1198 (T.T.A.B. 1984) ("Color--even color applied over the entire surface of the goods
-is really nothing other than a type of product ornamentation."), rev'd on other grounds,
774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg.,
65 F.3d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1995) ("While there is no fixed rule for the amount of proof
necessary to prove secondary meaning, in the case of a color mark for a trade dress the
burden is heavy because color marks by their very nature are not generally distinctive.");
Lupo, supra note 29, at 663-64 ("[T]he public normally perceives color as mere ornamen-
tation and not as a source identifier."); Schechter, supra note 43, at 481 ("When a con-
sumer sees a product with a particular coloration, the consumer usually believes the color
to be mere decoration, not an indication of the product's source.").
117. See, e.g., Major Pool Equip. Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 582 (noting that
"deadening repetition of even a distinctive design" may be perceived as "mere [] orna-
mentation"). See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.11, at 7-54.
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or background. 118
In addition, some particular solid colors may be less likely to
receive protection than others. For example, the fact that the color
black is compatible with other colors increases the chance that its
application as a solid will be found functional.11 9 The same might
be said of' the color white,, untinted transparent substances, and
possibly primary colors. Similarly, the fact that black is in a sense
a "default" choice may limit its chances of being considered "arbi-
trary." 1 20 Recognizing the fact that colors arise in trademarks only
as elements of composite marks does not preclude generalizations
about how marks which purport to present distinctive uses of a
solitary color will be treated.
C. Clarifying Existing Law: Protection of Colors in Liquids
Recognizing that a trademark for a "color alone" is really a
trademark for "a solid color applied all over without variation"
does not necessarily change the applicability of the above princi-
ples. It may, however, increase the precision of their application.
At the very least, the recognizing that all marks are composites
explains a series of holdings that has tended to elude precise expli-
cation. It is generally acknowledged that trademark protection
should not be conferred on the color of liquids. 12' For example,
protection has been denied, on the basis of attenuated findings of
"functionality" or other reasons, for the use of the color pink in
liquid stomach preparation,1 22 the chocolate color of a medicinal
118. Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir.) ('The
mere division of a label into two background colors, as in this case, is not, however,
distinct or arbitrary .... ), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949).
119. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531-32 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995).
120. See, e.g., Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics, Mfg., 858 F. Supp. 361,
367 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[It strikes this Court as nonsensical to label ihe color black as
arbitrary because many other options were available."), aff'd, 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir.
1995).
121. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 7.19, at 7-83 ("Claims to trademark rights in
the color of a liquid product or medicinal preparation have usually been refused.").
122. See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569,.572 (2d Cir.
1959) (refusing to enjoin competitor's use of pink in medicinal product where likelihood
of confusion had not been established, and where the color was found functional since it
90 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
liquid 123 and amber in mouthwash. 24 These holdings supplement
the Supreme Court's observation in 1920 that a liquid beverage's
"coloring matter is free to all who can make it if no extrinsic de-
ceiving element is present."'
' 25
There is another reason, however, to deny protection in liquid
cases. When a liquid is colored, the configuration of the color is
necessarily "solid," "applied all over," and "without variation."
Stripes, for example, are an impossibility for all but the thickest
liquids that approach the consistency of pastes.'26 Thus, conferring
a trademark monopoly in this context could deplete the available
palette from which competitors may choose. With respect to colors
of liquids, there truly is a relatively limited number of arrange-
ments available, and removing one could unduly handicap competi-
tors. Colors of liquids, therefore, may be the only context in which
the "color depletion" argument has some merit and viability.
The attraction of obtaining a color mark for a liquid is appar-
ent: it may be the only way to identify the source of a liquid that
changes containers as it moves through the distribution chain.
Liquids are necessarily sold in containers which themselves are
capable of supporting a variety of identifying marks. However,
liquid products may be mass produced at one location and then
distributed to resellers so that the original packaging, with its
"present[ed] a pleasing appearance" and was soothing to the person who imbibed the
product), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
123. See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531-33 (1924)
(refusing to enjoin competition from using chocolate in solution for coloring and flavoring
purposes and as suspension medium, but suggesting to district court that it impose on
remand a decree that would require clear labeling with directions to druggists not to
substitute Petitioner's product for Respondent's).
124. See Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory's Corp., 718 F. Supp. 389, 396 (D. N.J.
1989) (amber color of liquid mouthwash held functional since it "signifies an unflavored,
medicinal mouthwash").
125. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 147 (1920).
126. Consider, for example, striped toothpastes. Some types of alcoholic drinks, and
indeed some other nonhomogenized liquids, such as salad dressing, may consist of levels
of different colors. These examples do not present an exception, however, to the observa-
tion that individual liquids are generally capable only of having a solid "all over" design,
since these examples involve combinations of multiple liquids of different densities and
colors.
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source-indicating features, is never seen by the end consumer."'
The simplest way, and possibly the only sure-fire way, then, to
ensure that an end user recognizes that a liquid product emanates
from a particular source is to color it.
Consider, for example, the case of a milk producer who wishes
to capitalize on the health-conscious consumer market by selling
milk products from rbGH-free cows. 12 8 Recognizing that milk is
often sold without its original packaging to consumers in restau-
rants, the manufacturer hits upon coloring its milk green to distin-
guish it from milk produced from cows that received bovine
growth hormone injections. The producer hopes, in this way, to
generate good will in consumers who might otherwise be unaware
of its products.
If this producer receives protection for the color green in milk
products and is successful at selling his or her product, other dairy
producers may also seek to color their products, potentially impli-
cating concerns over "shade confusion" and "color depletion." As
a practical matter, if the campaign were truly successful, green
could become equated in consumers' minds with "rbGH-free" rath-
er than with a particular manufacturer. In this event, "genericide,"
rather than a general prohibition on color marks, would be the basis
on which protection would be denied. 129
127. The fact that liquids are dependent on the containers that hold them raises an
interesting issue. If one manufacturer succeeds in trademarking a translucent green bottle,
cf. California Crushed Fruit Corp. v. Taylor Beverage & Candy Co., 38 F.2d 885 (D. Wis.
1930) (considering trademark protection for "black, opaque, 'champagne' shaped bottle"),
is it infringed by a similarly shaped blue translucent bottle that contains a yellow liquid,
the combined effect of which is precisely that green protected by the first manufacturer's
trademark? See Norwich Pharmacal, 271 F.2d at 573 ("Limitation of the injunction to
the suppression not of the pink colored medicine but only of the color which the purchas-
ing public might see through a clear glass bottle is indicative that the [district] court felt
that the plaintiff had preempted unto itself exclusively and forever this appearance of a
pink color for a stomach medicine."), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
128. rbGH is the common name for the bovine growth hormone BST which is used
to increase milk production in cows. James Ridgeway, Robocow: How Tomorrow's
Farming Is Poisoning Today's Milk, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 14, 1995, at 27.
129. The term "genericide" refers to the process by which a mark ceases to indicate
a source and instead is understood by the public to refer to the product itself. See gener-
ally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 12. Generic designations cannot receive trademark
1995]
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D. Can Color Marks Be Inherently Distinctive?
Qualitex left unanswered a significant issue, one that was iden-
tified and pressed by the Court extensively during oral argument:
can a color be so inherently distinctive as not to require a showing
of secondary meaning 130 prior to registration? 31 Under the Lanham
Act, inherently distinctive marks do not require proof of secondary
meaning as a prerequisite for registrability, while "merely descrip-
tive" marks do. 32 The Petitioner's attorney, the representative of
the United States, and the attorney for the Respondent each de-
clined the Court's repeated invitations during oral argument to
hypothesize an inherently distinctive color. 33 Since the Court ac-
protection since, by definition, they can no longer serve a trademark function (source-
identification). Genericide is the danger against which most popular marks must guard.
Colors on liquids may be particularly prone to genericide precisely because of liquids'
dependence on packaging. If the packaging is absent so that the color of the liquid is
clearly seen, the association in the consumer's mind is that between the product and its
color, and not that between the color and the product's source or the product and its
source.
130. See supra note 24.
131. See Oral Argument at 13 (Petitioner's attorney explains that he is not asking the
Court to decide this issue).
132. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)-(f) (1994). Marks that are "arbitrary," "fanciful," or
non-descriptive but "suggestive" are considered "inherently distinctive," and thus do not
require secondary meaning as a prerequisite to registration. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note
24, § 16.02, at 16-4. The Supreme Court extended this. classification scheme to "trade
dress" cases in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, reh'g denied, 113
S. Ct. 20 (1992).
Other courts which considered, prior to Qualitex, whether secondary meaning is
required for colors generally held that it was. See e.g., Master Distribs. Inc. v. Pako
Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[A] manufacturer's mere use of a certain color
will not automatically grant it proprietary rights-the manufacturer must establish all the
normal requirements for trademark protection, including secondary meaning."); see also
Burgunder, supra note 28, at 600 (reasoning that secondary meaning should be required
"[s]ince the set of basic color hues is limited [and] there may be a potential for market
inefficiencies, just as with descriptive marks") (footnotes omitted); Ebert, supra note 81,
at 406 (advocating a system of protection of colors in which registrants would first have
to prove nonfunctionality and secondary meaning); Summerfield, supra note 81, at 983-84
("Secondary meaning must be shown for a color to be registered as a trademark." (citing
In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
There is some disagreement regarding whether color marks are, by nature, descrip-
tive. See Peterson, supra note 82, at 756-57 & nn.32-34; Bridge, supra note 82, at 492
(noting that "courts generally consider color marks as descriptive").
133. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 3, passim (repeated questions regarding whether
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cepted the district court's determination that Petitioner's use of the
green-gold color had acquired secondary meaning, it was not re-
quired to resolve the issue of whether a color "pure and simple"
could be inherently distinctive.1 34
showing secondary meaning should be a prerequisite to registration of colors, and whether
any color could be "inherently distinctive"). One colloquy is instructive of the Court's
persistence and mounting frustration:
QUESTION: [W]e're asking you, is it possible [for a color to be inherently
distinctive and not require secondary meaning]? If you wanted it, could you get
it?
MR. MULAK: That's a very unique question in the sense that if it-
QUESTION: It's not unique, it's been asked about 20 times from up here
and-
QUESTION: We've gotten about five different answers.
QUESTION: -and we still don't have an answer.
MR. MULAK: If it is inherently distinctive in color, .which we, of course,
would argue that the Qualitex color is distinctive-we're not arguing it's inher-
ently distinctive. We established our trial court record by proving after 30
years of use that people have recognized it as a sole source. We're not taking
it that far as to say, this color is inherently distinctive.
QUESTION: You don't want us to reach that issue?
MR. MULAK: That's correct. We've not asked that point.
Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
134. Some have read Qualitex as requiring that secondary meaning be established
before marks consisting of "a single color" will be protected under the Lanham Act. See,
e.g., Knitwaves Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., Nos. 94-7968, 94-9024, 1995 WL 673250, at *12
(2d Cir: Nov. 13, 1995); Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58 n.3
(2d Cir. 1995); Schechter, supra note 43, at 505, 509-11; Mark S. Sommers, Owning Your
Own Colour, TRADEMARK WORLD (United Kingdom), May 1995, at 18, 19 (reading
Qualitex as holding that "colour must earn its right to trademark protection, just like
descriptive words or symbols do, by attaining secondary meaning in the minds of consum-
ers").
The Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding that Qualitex's color mark
had acquired secondary meaning. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308 ("[Iln light of the District
Court's here undisputed findings .... "); see also id. at 1305 ("Having developed second-
ary meaning (for customers identified the green-gold color as Qualitex's), it identifies the
press pads' source."); id. at 1308 ("Having determined that a color may sometimes meet
the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark . . . .") (emphasis added). Therefore,
the question of whether a color mark could be registered on the basis of its inherent
distinctiveness (i.e., without secondary meaning) was not before the court. See also supra
notes 132-33. Any inclination in the opinion to decide that issue one way or another is
merely dictum. Cf. Paul R. Morico, Protecting Color Per Se in the Wake of Qualitex v.
Jacobson, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK Soc'Y 571, 571 (1995) (noting that "[c]olor marks
are rarely inherently distinctive [and] often require substantial promotion to acquire
secondary meaning," thereby implying that some color marks can be inherently distinctive,
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As framed by the Court during oral argument, the question was
whether a particular color alone could be inherently distinctive. 35
As a consequence, the Court framed its hypotheticals in terms of
"weird color[s]" such as "lime yellow," "lavender," and "hot neon
pink." 36 The question was hard to answer precisely because color
is something that cannot be considered in isolation. As Qualitex's
attorney reiterated, the company was not seeking to protect against
use of "green-gold" on products generally, but merely against use
on the types of pads that it produced.137 A particular color may be
distinctive in one context and not distinctive in another, a reality
that is obscured by consideration of the hypothetical
trademarkability of "color."
The more precise, and more easily answered, question is wheth-
er a trademark consisting of a solid color blanketed over a particu-
lar product without variation can be inherently distinctive. Clearly,
the answer is "yes." Suppose, for example, that Nabisco, con-
cerned with the proliferation of other brands of peanuts, decided to
paint its Planter's cocktail peanuts purple. Its choice of color
would indisputably be both "fanciful" and "arbitrary," given that
the color purple is not a natural color for nuts. Given the peculiari-
ty of the choice of color, it seems plausible that consumers merely
presented with a bowl of purple peanuts, perhaps in a bar or restau-
rant, would immediately recognize the product as emanating from
a particular source.
According to the principles discussed above, the trademark
even in Qualitex's wake) (emphasis added); id. at 579 ("[l]f a particular color is inherent-
ly distinctive ... it should be entitled to registration and enforcement.").
135. See Oral Argument at 6-13, 25-26, 32-33 (colloquy on whether color can be
inherently distinctive).
136. Id. at 12 ("weird color"); id. at 13 ("lime yellow"); id. at 27 ("lavender for
ironing board covers"); id. at 32 ("hot neon pink").
137. Id. at 10 ("[W]e are not attempting to appropriate color generally across the
board to apply to every product that's manufactured in this country. We are seeking, and
we did obtain a registration from the Patent & Trademark Office for this green-gold color
as applied in a limited area, to press pads only."). As a practical matter, the limitation
on the scope of Qualitex's mark will be determined first, by application of the Trademark
Office's "related goods" test to others seeking to register the same color, and second, by
application of tests of infringement such as the Polaroid factors. See supra part I.F.
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sought in this hypothetical would be "the uniform blanketing of all
of the product in a container of Planters peanuts with solid purple."
A competitor could theoretically release noninfringing peanuts in
which only one half of each nut was covered with purple. Alterna-
tively, the competitor might be able to combine purple peanuts with
peanuts of other colors without infringing Nabisco's mark.
The peanuts example demonstrates that whether a color will be
considered inherently distinctive depends, at least in part, on how
disjunctive is its use.'38 Purple is both an artificial and an unex-
pected color for nuts; therefore, its use on peanuts might readily
trigger recognition in consumers that it is serving a source-iden-
tifying function. Purple on a particular item of clothing would not
be disjunctive; consequently, consumers would have to learn of its
source-identifying role through other channels-suggesting the
appropriateness of requiring a showing of secondary meaning for
protection in that instance, but not in the former.
E. Meshing Qualitex with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
Decision in Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Gregor, Lawlor, Roth,
Inc.
In a post-Qualitex decision, Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger,
Lawlor, Roth, Inc.,13 9 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied
protection for a greeting card manufacturer's trade dress on
grounds that it was a "concept" that lacked sufficient expression.' 40
Analogizing to copyright law, the court explained: "[Jiust as copy-
right law does not protect ideas but only their concrete expression,
neither does trade dress law protect an idea, a concept, or a gener-
138. Qualitex, 115 S.Ct. at 1303 ("But over time, customers may come to treat a
particular color on a product or its packaging (say, a color that in context seems unusual,
such as pink on a firm's insulating material or red on the head of a industrial bolt) as
signifying a brand.") (emphasis added); cf. Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc. v. K & K Neckwear,
Inc., 897 F. Supp. 789, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The plaintiff... has failed to prove that
its particular use of bright colors and geometric patterns, in an industry in which the use
of such design elements is common, is 'striking, unusual, or otherwise likely to differenti-
ate the products of a particular producer."' (emphasis added) (quoting Mana Prods., Inc.
v. Columbia Cosemetics Mfg. Corp., 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995))).
139. 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995).
140. id. at 32-33.
1995]
96 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
alized type of appearance."' 4' The court was concerned that con-
ferring trademark protection on the "concept" of die-cut greeting
cards would foreclose competitors from developing similar prod-
ucts. 42 The mark for which appellant sought protection consisted
of "straight-on, strong photographic, glossy images of animals,
persons or objects on die-cut cards that are cut without bleed of
any kind."'1
43
On its face, this holding seems to conflict with the Supreme
Court's adoption in Qualitex of an extremely liberal construction
of protection under the Lanham Act, and in particular the Court's
statement that "[i]t is the source-distinguishing ability of the mark
... not its ontological status ... that permits it to serve" the trade-
mark function. 44 The Supreme Court explained:
The language of the Lanham Act describes [the universe of
things that can qualify as a trademark] in the broadest of
terms. It says that trademarks 'includ[e] any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.' Since hu-
man beings might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost any-
thing at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this lan-
guage, read literally, is not restrictive. 45
Under this liberal construction, appellant's die-cut photograph
scheme should have been characterized as a "device" under the
Lanham Act.146 The problem appellant's mark posed was not one
of ontological trademarkability but the more practical one of its
capacity to be recognized as carrying source-identifying informa-
141. Id. at 32.
142. See id. at 33 (describing the purpose of trade dress law as "to protect an owner
of a dress in informing the public of the source of its products, without permitting the
owner to exclude competition from functionally similar products").
143. Id. (quoting Appellant's Reply Brief at 6-7).
144. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
145. Id. at 1302-03 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 21-25 and accompanying
text.
146. The RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 42, defines
"device" broadly to include: "1. a thing made for a particular purpose, esp. a mechani-
cal, electrical, or electronic invention or contrivance. 2. a plan, scheme, or procedure for
effecting a purpose.... 5. something elaborately or fanc'fully designed."
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tion. 147
Moreover, given the relative complexity of the appellant's mark
in Milstein as compared to Qualitex's mark, how can Qualitex's
green-gold, "pure and simple," be a candidate for protection when
the Milstein appellant's cannot? Can Milstein be reconciled with
Qualitex? More generally, can a proposed mark ever be too basic
to receive protection?
In denying protection on the grounds of insufficient expressive-
ness, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was apparently influ-
enced by copyright law's insight that protection of overly basic
expression can be anticompetitive.148 Copyright law recognizes that
protection of ideas and concepts may inhibit development of the
very works that copyright law is designed to encourage. 149 A full
discussion of copyright law is beyond the scope of this Article;
what follows is a short summary of copyright doctrine commonly
invoked to limit protection to expression that is not too basic.
First is the requirement that the copyrighted work be "mini-
mal[ly]" creative, which is read into the statutory limitation on
copyright protection to "original works of authorship."' 50 In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,151 the Supreme
Court explained that "[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright,
means only that the work was independently created by the author
(as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity."1 52  The originality re-
147. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
148. See generally 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRAC-
TICE §§ 1.2.2.2 to 1.2.2.4 (identifying limitations imposed on copyrightable subject matter
which are designed to encourage creativity) (1984 & Supp. 1994); cf. Jay Dratler, Distill-
ing the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 245-47
(1988) (discussing role of "fair use" doctrine in checking copyright's creativity-impeding
impulses).
149. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, at §§ 1.2.2.2. to 1.2.2.4.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
151. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
152. Id. at 345; see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,
102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) ("All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the [copy-
right] statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial'
variation .... ). Professor Goldstein notes that some judicially-imposed requirements-a
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quirement is sometimes used by courts to deny copyright protection
to very basic expression, including "fragmentary words or phras-
es. 153 However, given the low threshold of the originality and
creativity requirements,'54 short slogans and the like may more
properly be denied protection on grounds that they are insufficient-
ly "expressive," as explained below. 55
Second is the statutory exclusion from protection of "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery."'' 56 Copyright distinguishes between the "idea" and
the "expression," giving protection only to the latter.157 Excluding
ideas and concepts is necessary to effectuate copyright's purpose
of promoting development of new works: "[i]n excluding protec-
"novelty threshold, a quantitative threshold, and an expenditure of labor threshold".-"may
contradict Congress' apparent intent to confine the originality standard to its traditionally
low level-that copyrightable elements be original only in the sense that they are not
copied from another source." I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, § 2.2.1, at 65 (citations
ommited).
153. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01(B),
at 2-16 (1994); see, e.g., Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (2d Cir.
1992) (sequence of one-word "ego fixations" held insufficiently creative); Magic Mktg.,
Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 771-72 (W.D. Pa. 1986)
(envelopes bearing words "telegram," "gift check," and "priority message" held insuffi-
ciently creative).
154. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, § 2.2.1, at 62.
155. See, e.g., Johnson v. Automotive Ventures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 507, 511-12
(W.D. Va. 1995) (phrase "test market pricing" held insufficiently expressive to receive
copyright protection). Professor Goldstein notes that the "originality" requirement and
the "idea-expression" distinction are somewhat intertwined. I GOLDSTEIN, supra note
148, § 2.3, at 75 ("A basic plot device, two or three musical notes strung together or the
combination of a few sketched lines will be unprotectible both because they are unexpres-
sive and because it is likely that the author copied them from one of the many sources
in which they have already appeared.") (citations omitted).
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery ... ").
157. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[Under copyright law,] protection
is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."); Lotus Dev't Corp. v.
Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[Clopyright assures authors the
right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work."), aff'd, - U.S. -, 1996 WL 12852 (U.S., Jan. 16,
1996) (No. 94-2003); CCC Info. Servs. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 68 (2d Cir. 1994) (similar). See generally 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, at § 2.3.
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tion for 'ideas,' [the copyright statute] adopts the longstanding rule
that copyright does not attach to the building blocks of creative
expression."' 158  Such building blocks may include "[ifndividual
colors and shapes," since "to give one creator a monopoly over
these basic elements would effectively stunt the efforts of other
creators to elaborate on these elements in the production of their
own works."'159 In addition, where the idea "merges" with the "ex-
pression", so that "the work's underlying idea can effectively be
expressed in only one way," courts will withhold copyright protec-
tion."' ° Courts seeking to distinguish protectable expression from
unprotectable ideas are required to engage in difficult, technical,
and somewhat "ad hoc"16 analysis of the actual elements that com-
prise a copyrighted work.
'Third, copyright does not protect functional attributes of "useful
articles," 62 which are more properly protected under patent law.
163
Under the statute:
the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a
[protectable] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if,
158. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, § 2.3.1, at 78; cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (describing a work of authorship in terms of
increasing generalities: "there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended."), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
159. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, § 2.3.1, at 78-79 (citations omitted).
160. See CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 68 ("[W]hen the expression is essential to the
statement of the idea, the expression also will be unprotected, so as to insure free public
access to the discussion of the idea."); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d
1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen an idea and its expression are indistinguishable, or
'merged,' the expression will only be protected against nearly identical copying."), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d
527, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1994) (similar). See generally 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, §
2.3.2, at 80.
161. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("useful article" defined as one "having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information").
163. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173
(1988) (Design Patent Law).
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and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictori-
al, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sep-
arately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article 64
The courts generally require that such protectable elements be
"physically" or "conceptually" separable from the useful article. 65
As with trademarks, part of the impetus behind the lack of
copyright protection for utilitarian features of works is to prevent
manufacturers from using copyright law to extract monopolistic
profits for unpatented goods. 66 Interestingly, as part of that analy-
sis, basic shapes that are needed by competitors are sometimes
interpreted as "utilitarian" and therefore nonprotectable1 67  Of
course, something may be functional for copyright purposes and
not for trademark purposes. 168
164. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The statute also defines "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works," which are copyrightable subject matter under the statute, id. § 102(a)(5), to
"include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned." Id. § 101.
165. See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147
(2d Cir. 1987) (bike rack denied copyright protection since its "aesthetic elements cannot
be said to be conceptually separable from [its] utilitarian elements"); Carol Barnhart Inc.
v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418-19 (2d Cir. 1985) (aesthetic features in
mannequins for clothing display held not physically or conceptually separate from their
use as utilitarian objects); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(shape of lighting fixture not "capable of independent existence as a copyrightable pictori-
al, graphic, or sculptural work apart from the utilitarian aspect" (quoting the Register of
Copyrights)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259
F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (simulation of antique telephone used as pencil sharpener
casing held physically separable).
166. See I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, § 2.5.3, at Il1 ("The purpose behind the
Copyright Act's denial of protection to the utilitarian aspects of industrial design is to
help protect consumers from paying more for unpatented utilitarian articles than the
articles cost to produce and to market."); cf. 2 id. § 8.5 (describing anti-competitive
effects of permitting copying of utilitarian works).
167. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 801 n.15 (quoting brief of the Register of Copyrights).
Professor Goldstein notes, however, that the argument advanced in Esquire would be
better resolved via operation of the merger doctrine, the "originality" requirement, and the
"idea-expression" distinction, and advocates maintaining the integrity of these doctrines,
by applying them precisely. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 148, § 2.5.3.1(C), at 111.
168. See, e.g., Brandir, 834 F.2d 1142 (affirming district court holding that bike rack
was not copyrightable since its utility was not separable from its aesthetic attributes, but
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Returning to the realm of trademarks, trademark law, unlike
copyright law, is not concerned with expressiveness per se. If the
keystone of copyrightability is expressiveness, that of trademark is
a mark's capacity to carry source-identifying information. 69 Any-
thing capable of carrying source-identifying information should be
able to serve as a trademark,, absent other objections such as func-
tionality."7 ° Whether or not the mark is recognized by consumers
as serving this source-identifying function is another problem alto-
gether.'7
It is true that a mark must be sufficiently expressive to carry
source-identifying information. 7 2 Given this minimal requirement
of expressiveness, conferring trademark protection on an elemental
building block of expression-a concept or an idea--could, at least
in theory, frustrate competitors' attempts to design their. own
marks.
In practice, it is very unlikely that protection of marks that are
very basic would have such an anticompetitive effect. It is the
author's suspicion that marks perceived as overly basic are in fact
merely underdescribed. 173 The proper grounds for denying protec-
tion in such cases is not a theoretical objection to such marks but
the fact that the mark's proponent has mischaracterized the mark
reversing and remanding for redetermination of whether functionality precluded trademark
protection).
169. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 2.01[1] ("In determining what can qualify
as a trademark, it is crucial that the symbol in question be so distinctive that it is capable
of. performing the function of identifying and distinguishing the goods that bear the
symbol."); see also text accompanying note 144 (quoting Qualitex).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
171. See supra note 24 (defining "secondary meaning").
172. See Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 361,
366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ('The makeup compacts at issue in the present case . . . draw
upon a small, rudimentary vocabulary of forms which, even in combination, do not speak
audibly of the products' origin.") (emphasis added), aff'd, 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995).
A mark, a slogan for example, may be sufficiently expressive to serve a source-identifying
trademark function, but insufficiently expressive to merit copyright protection. See, e.g.,
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1993) ('The Travel Planner").
173. See supra part III.A.2. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., Nos. 94-7968,
94-9024, 1995 WL 673250, at *10 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 1995) (asserting that defendant had
construed plaintiff's trade dress "too broadly" in arguing that conferrring protection would
be anticompetitive).
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to which he or she has rights. 174 In the Milstein case, for example,
it would have been helpful to know: (1) did appellant use exclu-
sively color photos, black and white photos or a mixture of each?
(2) were they of a consistent size? (3) was the paper used consis-
tently of the same thickness and texture? etc. These are all points
of variation on which a competitor could have seized in creating a
potentially noninfringing line of cards.
175
The fact that alternative designs exist does not mean that a
mark deserves protection. In Milstein, the court also implicitly
found that the mark for which protection was sought was "gener-
ic.' ' 176 The term "generic" implies an incapacity to serve a source-
identifying function.' 77 The mark's inability to serve this function
was a proper basis for denying protection, even as its ontological
nature as an "idea" or "concept," in actuality a "device," was not.
178
CONCLUSION
All trademarks are composites of an infinite variety of design
elements: some obvious to the senses, and some latent. At stake
in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. was not whether color,
in some disembodied form, is protectable under trademark law.
Instead, the issue was whether a solid color of a designated hue,
174. See supra part III.A.2.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
176. See Milstein, 58 F.2d at 34.
177. See supra note 129.
178. The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's determination that the
"mark" lacked secondary meaning, holding in effect that, even if it were capable of
carrying source-identifying meaning, the mark had failed to be perceived as doing so by
the public. Milstein, 58 F.2d at 34. That result reflects a recurrent concern in trade dress
cases: where the trade dress is the product configuration, the consumer will tend not to
identify the attributes as serving a source-identifying function, but rather as simply pre-
senting a pleasing design. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431,
1440 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The difficulty is that.., a product configuration differs fundamen-
tally from a product's trademark, insofar as it is not a symbol according to which one can
relate the signifier (the trademark, or perhaps the packaging) to the signified (the prod-
uct)."); see also Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., Nos. 94-7968, 94-9024, 1995 WL
673250, at *11 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 1995) (citing Duraco and DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b).
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saturation and brightness, applied in a manner that conformed to
the shape of a product, without variation in any of the previous
elements, was protectable. Recognizing the richness and complexi-
ty of the Qualitex mark throws into relief the possible points of
deviance available to competitors seeking to incorporate Qualitex's
"green gold." The philosophical question of whether Qualitex's
mark, and color marks in general, should be protected becomes an
easy one, if properly construed: given the multiplicity of potential-
ly noninfringing uses of Qualitex's color available to competitors,
no reasonable basis exists for denying protection.
In failing to recognize the composite nature of Qualitex's mark,
and, specifically, in apparently determining to protect exclusively
the disembodied "green gold" hue, the Supreme Court violated the
Anti-Dissection Rule. This Article has suggested that
underdescription of marks-a tendency to leave out both latent and
nonlatent elements of marks in describing the entirety of the mark
to be protected-is systemic in trademark decisions.
Underdescription violates the Anti-Dissection Rule, and it unneces-
sarily creates anticompetitiveness problems that work against pro-
tection of otherwise valid marks.
When confronting an infringement action involving a mark that
appears to lack capacity to serve a trademark function, courts
should look carefully to see if the mark has been truly described in
its entirety. If the mark's proponent has underdescribed the mark's
elements, perhaps in an attempt to get broader protection than it
deserves, then that should be the basis for denying protection.
Only if the mark truly is incapable of serving a trademark function,
because it is generic or because needed public awareness of its
source-carrying functions has not developed, is an unqualified deni-
al of protection appropriate.
Recognizing a greater degree of complexity in a mark should
not translate into greater protection. In an infringement action
involving two marks, the outcome turns on whether the marks'
overall impressions are confusing. Latent elements, by definition
those elements of which the perceiver of the marks is less sensitive
or perhaps even unconscious, are unlikely to make the difference
in a finding of confusion or nonconfusion.
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Nonetheless, recognition of latent elements may have a practical
effect in infringement actions. It may assist the mark-holder in
rebutting a defendant's claim that its mark is invalid on
anticompetiveness or other grounds. The courts may sometimes
too easily deny protection without even reaching the issue of con-
fusion as to source, on the grounds that protecting plaintiff's mark
will confer an unreasonable disadvantage on competitors. Many of
those competitors may be hypothetical, and most may not even be
before the court. Thus, considering the mark's latent elements may
enable a plaintiff to prosecute its action, even if it will not guaran-
tee plaintiff's victory on the infringement issues.
The ultimate consequence of adopting what is, in effect, a more
liberal approach to protectability would be to relieve pressure on
courts to engage in abstract analysis at the outset of the case.
Correlatively, it would put more emphasis on the substantive is-
sues: whether the plaintiff has demonstrated secondary meaning,
in the event that his or her mark is not inherently distinctive; and
whether infringement exists. Given our jurisprudential and consti-
tutional mandate to litigate concrete rather than hypothetical dis-
putes, to adjudicate "cases and controversies," is that not a worthy
result?
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